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Inadequate track drainage can lead to a variety of issues, including flooding, accelerated track 2 
degradation and progressive or sudden railway track, slope or embankment failure. These can result in 3 
unplanned track maintenance, additional passenger travel costs and damage to third party property. 4 
However, railway drainage asset management is challenging because it involves the consideration of 5 
large interconnected assets, limited maintenance budgets, and unknown failure probabilities. To address 6 
this issue, this paper introduces a risk-informed approach for railway drainage asset management that 7 
uses fault tree analysis to identify the factors that contribute to railway drainage flood risk and quantifies 8 
the likelihood of the occurrence of these factors using Monte Carlo simulation. This rational approach 9 
enables drainage asset managers to evaluate easily the factors that affect the likelihood of railway track 10 
drainage failure, thereby facilitating the prioritisation of appropriate mitigation measures and in so 11 
doing improve the allocation of scarce maintenance resources. The analysis identified 46 basic and 49 12 
intermediate contributing factors associated with drainage failure of ballasted railway track (undesired 13 
event). The usefulness of the approach is demonstrated for three sites on the UK railway network 14 
namely, Ardsley Tunnel, Clay Cross Tunnel and Draycott. The analysis shows that the Clay Cross 15 
Tunnel had the highest probability of drainage failure and should be prioritised for maintenance over 16 
the other two sites. The maintenance required should focus on blockages due to vegetation overgrowth 17 
or debris accumulation.  18 
Keywords: Railway drainage failure; Fault tree analysis (FTA); Monte Carlo simulation (MCS); Risk 19 

























Proper railway track drainage is critical to the performance of any ballasted railway since it directly 2 
impacts the railway track structure (28). Inadequate track drainage can lead to a variety of issues, 3 
including flooding, accelerated track degradation and progressive or sudden railway track, slope or 4 
embankment failure. These issues in turn can result in unplanned track maintenance and the imposition 5 
of speed restrictions and delay times, additional passenger travel cost, damage to third party property 6 
and farming land (51,55). Travel delay costs in the UK due to railway drainage failure alone amounted 7 
to £119 m during the period 2000 – 2017 (39). Despite the potential costly impacts of inadequate railway 8 
drainage, managing the maintenance of drainage assets is still often undervalued, in part because it is 9 
not considered to be important or difficult to achieve.  10 
  11 
However, railway drainage asset management is challenging because it involves the consideration of 12 
large interconnected networks of assets, significant parts of which are buried and therefore difficult to 13 
assess. These assets are made from a variety of materials which deteriorate at different rates, are of 14 
varying ages and unknown maintenance history. In addition, the railway operational environment 15 
constraints maintenance activities spatially and temporarily, maintenance budgets are often limited, and 16 
the impact of drainage failure varies significantly across the railway network.  This is exacerbated in 17 
many countries which have ageing railway networks where the track and its drainage assets can be 150 18 
years old and are nearing the end of their useful life necessitating increased rates of expenditure (16). 19 
In the UK for example, it is estimated that the cost of drainage renewals doubled from £184/m in 2014 20 
to £368/m in 2016 (51). A risk-informed approach to railway drainage asset management is therefore 21 
required that allows the uncertainties associated with the extent and performance of assets and the 22 
adverse impacts of their failure to be considered. Such an approach provides a rational and transparent 23 
means for arguing for maintenance budgets and prioritising expenditure.  24 
 25 
Various studies advocate the use of risk management to inform decision making in the railway industry, 26 
typically to identify potentially harmful events and quantify their frequency of occurrence and impact. 27 
Such studies include those associated with safety and the degradation of the track infrastructure. For 28 
example, derailment (30) and failure of rolling stock (2); the safe operation of infrastructure including 29 
tunnels (8), level crossings (9) and signals (59); security threats ranging from vandalism to terrorism 30 
(20,49); the impact of ballast fouling on drainage performance (53), earthwork failure (14,41), and 31 
infrastructure maintenance (12, 60).  Several other studies focus on the effect of outside agents (weather, 32 
flooding, landslides and earthquakes). For example, flooding risk and its impacts on the operation of 33 
conventional rail in the UK (32,46), the weather on urban rail transit facilities in Beijing (31), track 34 
disruption due to landslides (27) and earthquakes (47). Risk-informed approaches to deal with economic 35 
impacts have been proposed, including cost overruns and demand shortfalls in urban rail (22) and 36 
investment appraisal (19). There is however a paucity of research on railway drainage risk.   37 
 38 
In the highways sector, drainage risk-informed studies are more prevalent. Barnet (7) developed an 39 
approach informed by expert opinion to identify and quantify the risks of highway drainage flooding 40 
and Kalantari and Folkeson (25) investigated the potential causes and impacts of extreme weather 41 
events on Sweden’s national road network.  Because of its potential severe impacts, the flood risk of 42 
urban drainage has been studied extensively and indeed risk assessment forms an integral component 43 
of the ASCE Standard Guidelines for the Design, Installation, and Operation and Maintenance of Urban 44 
Subsurface Drainage (3).   45 
In this regard, Coulthard and Frostick (13) formulated an approach based on spatial map analysis, taking 46 
into account the performance of pumping stations and sewer networks to investigate the causes of 47 
flooding in the UK city of Hull.  Veldhuis et al. (57) proposed an integrated fault tree analysis-Monte 48 
Carlo simulation model to identify and quantify the major factors contributing to urban flooding based 49 
on reports from public call-centre and demonstrated their approach for Haarlem in the Netherlands. 50 
Risk-informed approaches have also been used to model the deterioration of urban drainage assets, 51 





To address the need for a risk-informed approach to help to identify sections of railway track at greatest 1 
flood risk and therefore prioritise investment to mitigate risk, this paper describes an approach to 2 
quantify the probability of drainage associated failure events at different locations in a railway network. 3 
In the approach, fault tree analysis (FTA) analysis is used to identify and estimate the probability of 4 
occurrence of the factors which contribute to drainage failure and takes into account uncertainty using 5 
Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS). The usefulness of this approach is demonstrated using three case 6 
studies of the UK’s railway network. Compared to previous work presented in the literature the 7 
proposed approach contributes to the following: 8 
 A risk-informed approach, that combines the use of FTA and MCS, to enable the probability of 9 
occurrence of railway drainage asset failure to be quantified. 10 
 A fault tree that identifies the causal factors that could lead to railway track drainage failure.  11 
 A conceptual framework that integrates drainage risk management within asset management. 12 
 13 
ASSET AND RISK MANAGEMENT 14 
Railway infrastructure asset management is a systematic, coordinated set of activities and practices that 15 
are carried out by an organisation to ensure the optimal performance of assets, at minimal risk, for a 16 
given budget to satisfy the organisation’s strategic plan (10). It can be considered to operate at strategic, 17 
tactical, and operational levels of decision making (34). At the strategic level of management, the 18 
organisation’s vision and mission are expressed in the corporate plan as part of strategic planning 19 
activities, and asset management framework is set, levels of service are aligned with strategic objectives, 20 
performance targets are agreed and the context for risk management established. Tactical level 21 
management concerns implementing the asset management framework and translating vision and 22 
mission statements to objectives and performance indicators. Operational management, on the other 23 
hand, is associated with defining standards and intervention levels of infrastructure asset condition.  24 
Strategies are developed to assess asset condition and thereafter implement works programmes (17)  25 
Railway organisations are required to understand and manage a variety of risks at each management 26 
level to enable effective asset management. The potential impacts of these risks can be used to support 27 
asset management by informing the organisation’s decisions regarding performance, investment and 28 
implementation of works programmes. Figure 1 summarises the three levels of asset management in 29 
terms of their relationship to an organisation’s policy, strategy and management activities and shows 30 
conceptually how risk management can support the asset management process at each of the three 31 
management levels (17). The policies define what the railway authority is aiming to achieve and are 32 
usually governed by stakeholder expectations, performance indicators and other targets. Strategy 33 
defines the mechanisms by which these policies are implemented and designates responsibilities within 34 
the railway authority. This is usually set out in corporate, business and operational plans, and is directly 35 
related to the three asset management levels. This translates into short-, medium-. and long-term 36 
operational decisions ranging from managing an asset component to the whole railway network while 37 
identifying critical assets and risks associated with the operational activities.  38 
Data Requirements 39 
The World Bank concept of information quality levels (IQL) has been used in this research to suggest 40 
the data requirements for different levels of railway asset management activity shown in Figure 1 (44).  41 
The IQL concept acknowledges that different qualities of data are required for these levels and it 42 
provides a standard for acquiring and using data when carrying out any management activity. This 43 
enables a sufficient amount and quality of data to be collected for the task in hand, thereby reducing 44 
unnecessary data collection and processing costs (48).   45 
 46 
RISK 47 
Risk identification, evaluation and mitigation can be considered as (34): 48 
 Asset related (loss or damage) 49 





 Environmental 1 
 Financial 2 
 Operational 3 
 Reputational 4 
 Safety 5 
 Service-related (reduction or failure) 6 
 7 
Formally risk, R, is evaluated through a combination of the probability of an event occurring and its 8 
consequence or impact, I, as defined by Equation 1 (24).  9 
 10 
𝑅 = 𝑃 × 𝐼           (1) 11 
 12 
In the context of railway drainage risk assessment, P is taken as the probability of flooding occurring 13 
and I is the impact of the flood event measured in terms of the eight above categories.  14 
This paper focuses on an approach to identify and determine the probabilities, of the underlying factors 15 











THE PROPOSED FTA-MCS APPROACH 1 
The approach proposed herein for estimating the probability of drainage failure of ballasted railway 2 
track (i) uses FTA to identify the factors that contribute to the failure of surface (i.e. pipes, catchpits 3 
and manholes) and subsurface (i.e. channel drains, ditches, outfalls and culverts) railway drainage 4 
assets, (ii) quantifies the probability of occurrence of these contributing factors (iii) takes into account 5 
the uncertainty of the information to estimate, using MCS, plausible ranges of the probability of 6 
occurrence values for each contributing factor. The approach is summarised in Figure 2 and is further 7 
described and justified below.   8 
 9 
 10 
Fault Tree Analysis 11 
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is widely used in reliability analysis to help to identify potential causes of the 12 
failure of systems and it has been used for similar applications to railway track drainage (31,57). 13 
Furthermore, FTA enables the probability of the failure to be determined quantitatively from an analysis 14 
of the causal events and contributing factors (45,57). An added attraction of such an approach is that an 15 
appropriately developed FTA can be used as a diagnostic tool to identify and correct the causes of 16 





failure. An FTA approach was therefore selected to identify and quantify the causal events and factors 1 
contributing to railway drainage failure.  2 
 3 
Fault Tree Development 4 
FTA is a deductive approach whereby a failure is decomposed into its associated contributing factors 5 
using a logic diagram known as a fault tree (FT) (e.g. see Figure 3) (31,45). For our work, the top event 6 
of the fault tree was defined as drainage failure.  7 
 8 
The review of the literature identified four categories of railway track drainage failure associated with 9 
the five predominant railway drainage asset types as shown in Table 2. Thereafter the information 10 
available in the literature together with brainstorming carried out with the aid of a contributing factors 11 
diagram was used to identify the potential causal factors for each failure mode. The contributing factors 12 
were separated into basic (i.e., that which has no contributing factor), and intermediate level factors 13 
(29) using a combination of information available in the literature and via a workshop. The workshop 14 
was attended by seven railway drainage and risk experts from Network Rail (NR), the UK’s railway 15 
infrastructure owner, and the authors. A total of 46 basic and 50 intermediate contributing factors were 16 
identified and assembled into eight categories, namely environment, subgrade, design, component 17 
(material) deterioration, installation, maintenance, and traffic (see Table 3). These contributing factors 18 
were related using Boolean Algebra/logic gates to form a typical fault tree as presented in Figures 3-4. 19 
 20 
It was assumed that the likelihood of occurrence of the contributing factors can be modelled using a 21 
Poisson process and that the basic events act independently. This suggests that the events will occur in 22 
any specified short period of time and will be approximately proportional to the length of that time 23 
period.  Similar assumptions were made by Veldhuis et al. (57) in a failure probability model for urban 24 
drainage system using FT.  Veldhuis et al. (57) postulated that the system, including all its various 25 
components (e.g. pipes, basins, surfaces infiltration capacity), returned to their initial states between 26 






C1 C2 C3 C4 C5
1 Blocked ● ● ● ● ●
Fully blocked √ √ √ √ √ Capacity is reduced to zero. Missing or ineffective covers, lack of silt trap (C2).
Partially blocked √ √ √ √ √ For C1, C2, C3, and C4 : 25%<capacity<50%. Seized flap valve (C4).
For C5,  capacity<50%. Silting, debris infiltration (C5).
2 Collapsed ● ● ● ● ● The drainage component is not fuctioned  properly.
Completely collapsed √ √ √ √ √
Partially collapsed √ √ √ √ √ General deterioration, scour (C4, C5).
3 Filter Media ● X X X X
Clogged
4 Indeaquate ● ● ● ● ●
Capacity
C1: Pipes; C2: Catchpits and Manholes;  C3: Channel Drains and Ditches;  C4: Outfalls; C5: Culverts
The capacity of the drainage component is reduced 
below a specified level.
Bank erosion and collapse, overgrown 
vegetation, frequent siltation and ponding (C3).
A major part of the pipe has cracked or deformed 
but the collapse is less than one pipe (C1) length or 
missing some parts (for C2, C3, C4, and C5).
A structural failure occurs on more than one pipe 
(C1)  length or the most parts of the structure (for 
C2,C3,C4, and C5).
Inadequate capacity issue associated with the 
outfall are as those above, albeit an inadequate 
gradient is  less of an issue (C4).
Inadequate gradient, inadequate pipe capacity for 
the catchment, accelerated runoff due to land use 
change within the catchment area, changes to 
upstream drainage condition, and extreme 
weather events (C3, C5).
Silting, poor alignment, vegetation/ root 
intrusion, debris infiltration (C1).
Geotextile layer as filter media inhibits water  
entering the pipe (C1) resulting water to remain on 
track surface or saturates the ground.
The components (C1, C2, C3, C4, and C5) are being  
overwhelmed by the flow of water, even they are in 
good working order (hydraulic surcharging).
Change of gradient due to subgrade settlement, 
the disturbance of formation, inadequate pipe 
capacity for the size of catchment runoff, and 
insufficient depth of catchpits and manholes (C1, 
C2).
Clogged through the accumulation of fines on the 
surface of geotextile layer (C1).
Bank instability, the removal of vegetation, scour, 
burrowing animals (C3).
Material corrosion, damage by ground movement, 
by track plant (i.e. track vehicles), train induced 
dynamic loads (C1, C2).
Affected Track Drainage Components
Subsurface Surface Potential CausesCondition and Indicators
 1 





Code Causal Event (Risk) Type Contributing 
Factor
Code Causal Event (Risk) Type Contributing 
Factor
X1 Poor filter BE Design X22 Lack of silt trap BE Design
X2 Root (tree) penetration BE Environmental X23 Aging catchpits and manholes BE Component
X3 Train dead load (track vehicles) overloading. BE Traffic X24 Insufficient depth catchpits and manholes BE Design
X4 Train live load (dynamic load, speed) 
overloading. BE
Traffic X25 Vegetation overgrowth 
BE Maintenance
X5 Weak soil BE Subgrade X26 Spoil tipping BE Maintenance
X6 Flooding from surface water (heavy rainfall) BE Environmental X27 Defective trash screen BE Maintenance
X7a Flooding from rivers BE Environmental X28 Aging channel drains and ditches material BE Component
X7b Flooding from sea BE Environmental X29 Scour around channel drains and ditches BE Environmental
X7c Flooding from reservoirs BE Environmental X30 Inadequate gradient of channel drains and ditches BE Design
X8 Excessive soil pressure BE Subgrade X31 Seized flap valve BE Component
X9 Aging pipes BE Component X32 Scour around headwall, apron and cascade BE Environmental
X10 Weathering (chemical) BE Environmental X33 Structural defect on headwall, apron and cascade BE Component
X11 Changes to land use (catchment area) BE Land use X34 Aging outfalls material BE Component
X12 Changes to upstream drainage condition BE Land use X35 Structural defect of culverts BE Component
X13 Inadequate pipe gradient BE Design X36 Sour of culverts (inlet or outlet) BE Environmental
X14 Inappropriate design of granular filter BE Design X37 Aging culverts material BE Component
X15 Fines accumulation from trenches surround 
pipe 
BE Maintenance
X38 Inadequate culverts gradient BE Design
X16 Fines accumulation from  pipe(s) surround 
drain 
BE Maintenance X39 Inadequate design (i.e. inadequate data, 
inappropriate product selection) 
BE Design
X17 Inappropriate design of geotextile filter BE Design X40 Damage caused by other assets/ 3rd party assets BE Land Use
X18 Scour of pipes BE Environmental X41 Damage caused by burrowing animals BE Maintenance
X19 Lack of debris clean out BE Maintenance X42 Damage caused by lack of structural maintenance BE Maintenance
X20
Non ballast material infiltration (waste from 
the train, spillage from the train, fly tipping) 
BE Maintenance X43 Damage caused by poor installation BE Installation
X21 Poor ballasting practices BE Maintenance X44 Prolong extreme hot wetaher BE Environmental  1 






Code Causal Event (Risk) Type Contributing 
Factor
Code Causal Event (Risk) Type Contributing Factor
H1 Excessive water infiltration to track bed IE Environmental D1 Blocked pipes IE Pipes failure
H2 Excessive shrinkage below drain level due to moisture 
loss
IE Environmental D2 Collapsed pipes IE Pipes failure
G1 Softening below drain level IE Subgrade D3 Inadequate capacity of pipes IE Pipes failure
F1 Settlement (change of gradient) IE Subgrade D4 Filter media problem of surrounding pipes IE Pipes failure
F2 Cess heave IE Subgrade D5 Blocked catchpits and manholes IE Catchpits and manholes 
failure
F3 Fines accumulation from surround pipes IE Maintenance D6 Collapsed catchpits and manholes IE Catchpits and manholes 
failure
F4 Erosion IE Environmental D7 Inadequate capacity of catchpits and manholes IE Catchpits and manholes 
failure
F5 Damaged or missing covers of catchpits and manholes IE Maintenance D8 Blocked channel drains and ditches IE Channel drains and 
ditches failure
E1 Silting pipes IE Maintenance D9 Collapsed channel drains and ditches IE Channel drains and 
ditches failure
E2 Ground movement IE Subgrade D10 Inadequate capacity of channel drains and ditchesIE Channel drains and 
ditches failure
E3 Overstress IE Traffic D11 Blocked outfalls IE Outfall failures
E4 Deterioration of pipes material IE Component D12 Collapsed outfalls IE Outfall failures
E5 Granular clogged (i.e. collector, carrier, french/land 
drain)
IE Design D13 Inadequate capacity of outfalls IE Outfall failures
E6 Geotextile clogged (i.e. collector, carrier drain) IE Design D14 Blocked culverts IE Culverts failure
E7 Catchpits and manholes blocked by debris IE Maintenance D15 Collapsed culverts IE Culverts failure
E8 Chambers filled or burried with material IE Maintenance D16 Inadequate capacity of culverts IE Culverts failure
E9 Silting catchpits and manholes IE Maintenance C1 Defective or failed pipes IE Pipes failure
E10 Deterioration of catchpits and manholes material IE Component C2 Defective or failed catchpits and manholes IE Catchpits and manholes 
failure
E11 Bank instability IE Subgrade C3 Defective or failed channel drains and ditches IE Channel drains and 
ditches failure
E12 Silting channel drain and ditches IE Maintenance C4 Defective or failed outfalls IE Outfalls failure
E13 Deterioration of channel drains and ditches material IE Component C5 Defective or failed culverts IE Culverts failure
E14 Silting outfall IE Maintenance B1 Defective or failed subsurface track drainage IE Subsurface track 
drainage failure
E15 Deterioration of outfall material IE Component B2 Defective or failed surface track drainage IE Surface track drainage 
failure
E16 Silting culverts IE Maintenance Code Undesired Event (Risk) Type Failure Mode  1 




















Establishing the relative importance of contributing factors 1 
To provide an initial insight into where mitigation measures should be targeted, a procedure is known 2 
as Fault Tree Importance Analysis was used to determine the relative importance of the basic 3 
contributing factors in causing railway drainage failure (see Figures 3 and 4). The procedure involved 4 
determining the minimal cut set of basic contributing factors are described below. A minimal cut set is 5 
the smallest group of basic factors that can occur, excluding redundant factors, for the top event to 6 
transpire.   7 
Typically, the algebra of sets is used to calculate the minimal cut sets, however, a simplified analysis 8 
can be used when the OR gate dominates the structure of an FT, as advocated by Ma et al. (31). This 9 
simplified analysis focuses only on the cut sets with an AND gate. Using this approach, scrutiny of the 10 
fault trees presented in Figures 3-4 yielded 51 minimal cut sets i.e., 51 ways in which basic contributing 11 
factors or their combinations can lead to railway track drainage failure.  12 
The minimal cuts sets are as follows:  13 
{X1}, {X2}, {X3}, {X4}, {X5}, {X6}, {X7a}, {X7b}, {X7c}, {X8}, {X3,X4,X5},{X3,X4,X6}, {X3,X4,X7a}, 14 
{X3,X4,X7b}, {X3,X4,X7c}, {X9}, {X10},{X11},{X12},{X13}, {X14},{X15},{X16},{X17}, 15 
{X18},{X19}.{X20}, {X21}, {X22}, {X23}, {X24}, {X25}, {X26}, {X27}, {X28}, {X29}, {X30}, {X31}, 16 
{X32}, {X33}, {X34}, {X35}, {X36}, {X37}, {X38}, {X39}, {X40}, {X41}, {X42}. {X43}, {X44} 17 
From the above list, it may be seen that the most frequent two are X3 (train dead load overloading) and 18 
X4 (train live load overloading), with six times, respectively. Also, the second most frequently 19 
contributing factors are X5 (weak soil), X6 (flooding from surface water due to heavy rainfall)), X7a 20 
(flooding from rivers), X7b (flooding from sea), and X7c (flooding from reservoirs), each of which occurs 21 
twice. This analysis suggests that train overloading will be one of the most likely occurring basic 22 
contributing factors followed by weak soil and flooding. 23 
Having established the minimal cut set, the method proposed by Zhao and Wang (58) was used to 24 
determine the relative importance of each basic contributing factor. According to Zhao and Wang (58) 25 










𝑗=1           (2) 29 
Where k is the total number of minimal cut sets, m is the total number of minimal cut sets containing 30 
basic contributing factor Xi  (i=1,,,,,,n), and Rj is the number of basic contributing factors of the minimal 31 
cut set j containing the basic contributing factor Xi. 32 
 33 
As an example, consider the basic contributing factor of a train dead load overloading (X3). From the 34 
above, it may be seen that this occurs in six minimal cut sets (i.e., m=6). Similarly, R1=1 and R2 = R3 = 35 
R4 = R5 = R6 =3 and K=51.  36 




























) = 0.0523 37
Following a similar analysis, it can be shown that 38 
 39 
X1=X2=X8=X9=X10=X11=X12=X13=X14=X15=X16=X17=X18=X19=X20=X21=X22=X23=X24=X25=X26=X2740 
=X28=X29=X30=X31=X32=X33=X34=X35=X36=X37= X38=X39=X40=X41=X42=X43=X44 = 0.0196,  41 






Accordingly, the five causal contributing factors that have the greatest influence on drainage system 1 
failure are X3, X4, X5, X6, X7a, X7b, and X7c 2 
Estimation of the Likelihood of Occurrence of Contributing Factors 3 
As described above, FTA uses Boolean algebra to relate failure to basic causal events.  Accordingly, 4 
the probability of a failure event can be estimated if the probability of occurrence of the basic 5 
contributing factor is known.  For example, the probability of blocked channel drains and ditches 6 
(P(D8)) can be estimated if the probability (P) of the factors contributing to its failure, involving X21, 7 
X25, X26, DE1, and E12 are known (see Table 3 and Figure 4) 8 
Assuming that the probability of occurrence of a basic contributing factor follows a Poisson process, 9 
i.e., the basic contributing factors occur in any specific short time period and the contributing factors 10 
are independent. Then the probability, 𝑃𝑋𝑖(𝑥) of x occurrences of a basic contributing factor in time t 11 








                              (3)14 
                15 
Where  16 
𝑃𝑋𝑖(𝑥) : the probability of x occurrences of basic event Xi in a period of time t 17 
λ : failure rate, the average rate of occurrence of events per time unit 18 
x : 0.1.2.3……n occurrence time(s) 19 
t : time period (e.g. per year) 20 
 21 
The failure rate 𝜆(𝑡) is defined by Equation 4 as follows: 22 
𝜆(𝑡) =
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 
                           (4) 23 
 24 
From Equation 4, the frequency of occurrence of the basic contributing factor, Xi, within a length of 25 




           (5) 27 
Where 28 
The length of the track is such that the frequency of occurrence of Xi is assumed to be constant along 29 
the length i.e. the section of track is termed homogenous.  30 
λXi : rate of occurrence of basic contributing factor Xi (time(s)/year) 31 
fXi : frequency of occurrence of basic contributing factor (time(s)/year) 32 
Lh : length of the homogeneous section (m) 33 
Ls : length of the sections exposed to failure (i.e. length of the assessed drainage assets)(m) 34 
 35 
The assumption of a Poisson process is not unreasonable since the occurrence of a contributing factor 36 
in any specified short time period is likely to confirm with the intended time period e.g., flooding from 37 
surface water may occur several times in one year and the occurrences of factors are statistically 38 
independent of a disjointed time period (4,57).  39 
Uncertainty estimation 40 
As discussed above the process of determining the likelihood of failure involves assessing the 41 





Poisson process requires the occurrence rate of drainage assets to be specified for the period of analysis.  1 
This rate, however, is difficult to quantify for drainage assets, particularly for ageing railways, since the 2 
number of historical occurrences is not always known. Further as operational and environmental 3 
conditions as are likely to change, the future rates may not match the historical rates on a given section 4 
of railway track. For example, increased drainage maintenance on a section of track may reduce the 5 
future number of times drains become clogged. Alternatively, a future increase in train loads and speeds 6 
may increase the loading on drainage components thereby increasing the occurrence rate. To address 7 
such uncertainties, a simulation technique is required which makes use of historical data and expert 8 
opinion to provide estimates of the likelihood of failure. MCS was chosen for this purpose since it can 9 
be used to model uncertain inputs using a variety of probability distributions (4,11) and it has been 10 
widely used for similar applications including those described by Garlic (23) and El-Cheikh and Burrow 11 
(20). The output of a Monte Carlo simulation is a range of possible outcomes each with a relative 12 
frequency, or likelihood, of occurrence.  13 
 14 
Accordingly, MCS was used to evaluate the effect of uncertainty by considering the occurrence rate (λ) 15 
as a distribution of potential values each with a probability. The triangular and PERT distributions are 16 
commonly used probability distributions for this purpose (15). PERT distribution was chosen since it 17 
has smoother tails at either end of the distribution which can better represent uncertainty (15). 18 
CASE STUDIES 19 
Following consultation with Network Rail (NR), the UK’s railway infrastructure owner and operator, 20 
three sites (i.e. Ardsley Tunnel, Clay Cross Tunnel and Draycott) were selected to demonstrate the use 21 
of the developed approach for the analysis of channel drains and ditches. All three sites have similar 22 
traffic levels and are considered to be ‘high priority mainlines’ by NR. These sites were selected based 23 
on: 24 
 The availability of ten years of records of historical incidents associated with drainage failure of 25 
ballasted railway track. These resulted in frequent flooding events that had substantial 26 
consequences (e.g., train delays, unplanned maintenance).  27 
 The presence of channel drains and ditches (C3). pipes (C1), catchpits and manholes (C2).  28 
 The availability of NR’s senior drainage engineer to provide an expert opinion about each site.  29 
 30 
For each of the three sites, the analysis was conducted over a 200 m length of the homogeneous section 31 
of track, concerning the probability of flooding as shown in Figure 4a-c. Accordingly, the assessments 32 
could be considered to be IQL II/III (44).  33 
Ardsley Tunnel 34 
Ardsley Tunnel is 206 m long and has 1,207 m of C3 drainage asset (see Figure 5a). The section is in 35 
the middle of a cutting, making it prone to flooding from excessive water dissipating from the top of 36 
the cutting when C3 drainage assets are defective or when they fail. The drains and ditches are adjacent 37 
to a wetland area and ponds, which as a result are subject to various basic contributing factors which 38 
can cause flooding, for example, scour. Historical data suggests that drainage associated problems are 39 
likely to occur, as indicated by the number of times the track has been submerged over the last ten years. 40 
For the analysis a homogeneous section after the tunnel gate towards Leeds was chosen.  41 
Clay Cross Tunnel 42 
Clay Cross Tunnel is 1,631 m long with 994 m of channel drains and ditches on either side (see Figure 43 
5b). The C3 drainage assets are built adjacent to a wetland and ponds.  44 
Draycott 45 
The Draycott site is adjacent to a canal, a highway and dense residential areas (see Figure 5c). The 46 
length of C3 drainage assets on the site is 3219 m on each side. The incident data shows that drainage 47 
related problems are likely to occur in the vicinity of the railway track located near to the canal and the 48 


























Figure 5 Homogeneous section and map of drainage assets at (a) Ardsley Tunnel, (b) Clay 





Failure probabilities at the selected sites 1 
The analysis of the three sites focused on the basic contributing factors associated with the failure of 2 
channel drains and ditches (C3) and the probability of three intermediate contributing factors namely 3 
blockage (P(D8)), collapse (P(D9)) and inadequate capacity (P(D10)). By inspection of Tables 3 and 4, it 4 
can be seen that there are 22 possible basic contributing factors associated with these three intermediate 5 
contributing factors.  However, an inspection of the available site data and from consultation with NR’s 6 
senior drainage engineer it was found that only 11 of these basic contributing factors were possible. 7 
Two are related to the environment (X6, X7a), three are associated with land-use (X11, X12, X40), five are 8 
related to maintenance (X19, X20, X25, X26, and X42) and one is related to components (X28). The 9 
estimated frequency of occurrence of each contributing factor and the sources of these data are 10 
summarised in Table 4.   11 
The probabilities of failure of the channel drains and ditches at the sites were determined by using the 12 
FT-MCS process described above.  Firstly, probability distributions were determined for each 13 
contributing factor and then these were combined using MCS taking into account the Boolean 14 
relationships described by the sub-Fault Tree for channel drains and ditches (see sub-FT C3 assets in 15 
Figure 4).  For example, the Boolean algebra for C3 assets may be written as Equation 6: 16 
  17 
P(C3) = 3.P(X6) + 3.P(X7a) + 3.P(X7c) + 2.P(X11) + 2.P(X12) + P(X19 + P(X20) + P(X25) +      18 
P(X26) + P(X28) + P(X29) + 2. P(X40) + P(X42) + P(X43)                      (6) 19 
 20 
Using the above equations (i.e. Equation 3- 6), the probability of occurrence of the contributing 21 
factors, failure modes, and failure event (i.e. P(C3)) were quantified. The input data were obtained 22 
from historical data (see Table 4). Figure 6a-c shows the resulting probability of occurrence of the three 23 
failure modes (i.e. blocked, collapsed and inadequate capacity), both individually and when combined 24 
(giving the likelihood of the occurrence of a defective or failed channel drains and ditches).  The results 25 
for the Ardsley tunnel, with 90% confidence, shows that the probability of blocked failure mode P(D8_90) 26 
is 3.01 - 6.95%, collapse P(D9) is 2.25-6.14%, inadequate capacity P(D10) is 1.63 - 5.49% and defective 27 
or failed channel drain and ditches are 9.44 - 16.18% (see Figure 6a). The corresponding values for the 28 
Clay Cross tunnel are 3.35 - 8.57%, 2.67 - 7.83%, 2.28 - 7.42% and 11.62 - 20.55% respectively (see 29 
Figure 6b). For Draycott, the corresponding probabilities are is 1.46 - 3.70% for blocked, 1.20 - 3.45% 30 
for collapse, 1.08 - 3.33% for inadequate capacity, and 5.17 - 9.03% for the failure of the channel drains 31 
and ditches (see Figure 6c). These results suggest that the focus of maintenance interventions should be 32 
on cleaning blockages due to vegetation overgrowth and debris cleanout. The probabilities of defective 33 
or failed channel drain and ditches, at the 90% confidence level, are 15.47%, 19.65%, and 8.65% for 34 
Ardsley tunnel, Clay Cross tunnel and Draycott respectively (see Figure 6a,b, and c). In all cases, the 35 
probability of defective or failed channel drains and ditches were observed to be higher than the value 36 
without considering uncertainty. For example, at Clay Cross tunnel the P(C3)_90 is 19.65%, whereas the 37 
value without considering uncertainty is 16.11% (see Figure 6b).  38 
From the above, it is evident that the likelihood of defective, or failed, channel drains and ditches at 39 
Clay Cross Tunnel is higher than at both the Ardsley Tunnel and Draycott sites. It is also apparent that 40 
blockages are more likely to occur than collapses and inadequate capacity at all three sites. The 41 
likelihood of defective, or failed, assets are also affected by the rate of occurrence of the basic 42 
contributing factors at the site. This can be seen from the likelihood values at the Draycott site. While 43 
the frequency of flooding at the Draycott site is higher than at the other two sites, the length of channel 44 
drains and ditches exposed to failure is the greatest at Draycott and therefore it was found to have the 45 

















Figure 6 The range of likelihoods of defective or failed C3 drainage assets P(C3) at (a) Ardsley Tunnel, (b) Clay Cross Tunnel and (c) Draycott 





To identify the factors that have the most influence on the probability of a failure, a sensitivity analysis 1 
was conducted by varying each possible causal factor in turn and keeping all others constant. The 2 
results, in the form of tornado graphs (see Figures 7a-c), show that the predominant causal factor for 3 
this type of failure across the three selected sites is flooding from surface water (X6). While the least 4 
influential factor for Ardsley Tunnel is non-ballast material infiltration (X20), it is flooding from rivers 5 















































Figure 7 Tornado graph as sensitivity analysis of MCS for (a) Ardsley Tunnel, (b) Clay Cross, 







CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 1 
This paper proposed a risk-informed approach to assess the probability of failure of drainage assets as 2 
an enabler for railway drainage tactical asset management. The approach provides a robust method that 3 
enables drainage asset managers to identify, scrutinise and rank the likelihood of the factors that can 4 
contribute to drainage failure. This can help the drainage asset manager to select and prioritise, in a 5 
rational and transparent manner, appropriate mitigation measures to locations in the railway network at 6 
greatest flood risk.   7 
A probabilistic fault tree approach was proposed to identify and interrelate the contributing factors that 8 
can lead to railway track drainage failure and by so doing enable the probability of drainage failure to 9 
be determined. Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS) was used to quantify the uncertainty associated with the 10 
probability of occurrence of these contributing factors and thereby the overall probability of failure of 11 
a drainage asset.  12 
Use of Fault Trees 13 
The fault tree approach was chosen because it provides a rational, structured approach to identify and 14 
interrelate the factors that can contribute to railway drainage failure. Further, the fault tree structure 15 
enables an analysis of the importance of the most influential causes of failure risk based on their position 16 
in the structure. The comprehensive list of identified contributing factors identified in the research can 17 
be converted into a simple checklist for an initial risk evaluation process.   18 
 19 
Fault tree development 20 
The developed fault trees were formulated from a combination of a review of the literature, 21 
brainstorming and expert elicitation via a focus group discussion (FGD). The FGD brought together 22 
senior drainage experts, risk managers and track bed engineers, all with considerable practical 23 
knowledge of railway operations (including track drainage) and provided a platform for the discussion 24 
of opinions and the sharing of expertise. Thus it enabled the experts to engage meaningfully in the 25 
development of the model. The format of the workshop helped to build consensus among experts 26 
through group discussion and helped to avoid bias which might have occurred during individual 27 
consultations. As a result, it was possible to identify complex potential faults and incidents that could 28 
lead to drainage failure and to better understand the resulting impacts which would not otherwise have 29 
been possible to ascertain from the literature alone. An added benefit was that the workshop brought 30 
together a variety of experts, not all of who are involved in the day to day management of drainage and 31 
who might therefore not otherwise have had such a forum to discuss and debate problems that are better 32 
solved collectively. The workshop thereby reinforced collective responsibility and collaboration within 33 
the organisation.   34 
 35 
This approach, however, is time-consuming and required significant human resource and buy-in from 36 
the railway organisation and it, therefore, may not be practicable for every application. To reduce the 37 
resources required in developing fault trees for other railways, the developed fault trees could be 38 
adapted for other railway environments. However, it needs to be borne in mind that the fault trees were 39 
configured with the UK railway operating environment in mind. i.e., a congested and ageing mixed 40 
passenger-freight railway network operating in relatively densely populated areas in a temperate 41 
climate. Any adaptation therefore of the developed fault trees would need to be done with care. 42 
 43 
Failure probabilities 44 
Determining the probability of the failure of drainage assets using the proposed approach involves 45 
providing a rate of occurrence of the basic contributing factors identified within the fault tree. For many 46 
railways, these rates of occurrence are difficult to quantify due to a paucity of historical data and also 47 
because changing operational and environmental conditions can mean that future rates of occurrence 48 
may not match those which have occurred in the past. To address this lack of data we proposed the use 49 
of a combination of expert opinion, historical data and information available in the literature to 50 
determine a plausible range of values for each contributing factor. To deal with uncertainty, MCS was 51 






Other methods could be used to deal with both uncertainty and the use of expert opinion, such as Fuzzy 1 
logic. However, the drainage experts within Network Rail who examined the outputs from the analysis 2 
of the three case studies found that the MCS outputs produced were easy to understand and that the 3 
approach was transparent, even though they were not experts in risk analysis. 4 
 5 
To simulate the rate of occurrence of a contributing factor a Poisson’s process was used since it is 6 
widely used in similar applications. For the three cases studies, the predicted ranges of occurrence of 7 
the basic events and the range of predicted drainage failure probabilities were discussed with drainage 8 
experts who found the ranges to be plausible. This suggests that the Poisson distribution used was 9 
appropriate for the case studies. Nevertheless, it is recommended that any application of the approach 10 
described here should consider other distributions, such as bernoulli, binomial, and geometric, as these 11 
might result in more appropriate predictions of failure for the application considered. However, these 12 
approaches require estimation based on trials or sequences where the first trial probability is known. 13 
This data however was not known for the three case studies. 14 
 15 
Although the fault tree model has been well received by the UK railway industry, further refinements 16 
are desired. In particular, the approach assumed that contributing factors occur independently and 17 
therefore dependencies between the failure mechanisms were not established within the fault trees. 18 
Consequently, possible interactions between failure modes were not considered.  19 
 20 
Risk and Asset Management 21 
The paper suggested, via a framework, how risk management can be incorporated within the three 22 
accepted levels of railway asset management, namely strategic, tactical and operational. The approach 23 
advocated in this paper for the assessment of drainage assets is designed to support tactical asset 24 
management decision making regarding the performance, investment and implementation of works 25 
programmes.  As far as performance is concerned, the approach enables the failure likelihood of 26 
sections of the railway network to be quantified and changes monitored over time.  The approach also 27 
facilitates the assessment of drainage asset failure in the medium term and allows for the identification 28 
and analysis of critical drainage assets, associated failure modes and the identification of sections of 29 
railway track at high likelihood of drainage failure.  The drainage failure likelihood of individual 30 
sections of railway track could also be amalgamated for an entire network, using a strategic level asset 31 
management approach, to yield a measure of overall railway drainage network performance.  By 32 
quantifying the performance of sections of track, investment in drainage maintenance and renewal can 33 
be target to those sections with the greatest failure probability and works programmes designed 34 
accordingly.  Such an approach would also aid in making a business case for investing in predictive 35 
and preventive asset management regimes. However, in order to be effective, the strategies designed 36 
to improve the reliability and resilience of the railway drainage assets need to account for 37 
uncertainties associated with predicting the performance and condition of the asset.  Furthermore, 38 
potentially expensive inspection and monitoring regimes could also be targeted towards those sections 39 
of track within a railway network with the greatest failure likelihood.  For example, results from the 40 
case studies suggest that surface flooding due to heavy rainfall is the major causal factor for drainage 41 
failure across all the three sites (see Table 4 and Figures 7a-c). The analysis showed that drainage 42 
blockages are more likely to occur than collapse or inadequate capacity. Consequently, maintenance 43 
interventions at all three sites should prioritise clearing blockages due to vegetation overgrowth and 44 
debris cleanout.  Further, considering the relatively higher probability of flooding from rivers, weather 45 
monitoring and flood defence schemes could be prioritised for Clay Cross Tunnel and Draycott sites 46 
instead of Ardsley Tunnel.  47 
 48 
As discussed above, data plays an essential role in the proposed approach since it is used to estimate 49 
the failure rate of the identified risk events and these governs the procedure for probability estimation.  50 
Integrating the proposed approach within a tactical level asset management system could enable data 51 
stored within the databases of such systems to be easily accessed and interrogated.  The customisation 52 
of the databases of typical tactical level asset management systems should include provision for data 53 





data associated with inventory, component condition, maintenance history and track usage.  Some of 1 
this additional data may need to be provided by expert opinion using the approaches discussed above.  2 
This can present a challenge for organisations not used to risk-informed asset management 3 
approaches.  In this research, this was overcome through the FGD setting that brought together senior 4 
drainage experts, risk managers and track bed engineers to discuss the issues and determine the 5 
likelihood of occurrence of events. 6 
Data used for tactical asset management can be regarded as being at IQL II-III and can be categorical 7 
i.e. summary data collected for sections of railway track between 20 m to 1 km in length (44). For the 8 
case studies, 200 m lengths of railway track were assessed because this is the length Network Rail 9 
uses for maintenance planning purposes and therefore there would be sufficient data being available 10 
for the assessment. The actual sections of track considered at the three sites were chosen so that the 11 
impacts of failure of any drainage assets could be considered to be constant, from a tactical asset 12 
management point of view, over the section.  An asset management system configured to deal with 13 
200 m sections of railway track could thereby be used to prioritise drainage maintenance interventions 14 
based on the likelihood of drainage risk failure for each 200 m section of railway track considered 15 
within the asset management system.  16 
 17 
Although this paper has developed a FTA-MCS approach to identify the factors which can cause 18 
drainage failure and quantify the contribution of these factors to failure probability under uncertainty, 19 
a comprehensive analysis of drainage failure risk also requires consideration of the potential impacts of 20 
failure (see Equation 1). Potential impacts which need to be considered include those associated with 21 
unplanned track maintenance/repair, third party damage, contractual issues, the environment, financing, 22 
operations (particularly where traffic has or is forecast to increase), reputation, safety and service 23 
provision [56]. Such an approach will enable economic appraisal using a whole life cycle asset 24 
management to inform inspection regimes, prioritise preventive maintenance of drainage assets in 25 
sensitive areas of greatest failure risk and to identify cost-effective strategies to reduce risk (60). The 26 
latter may include, for example, the of use more initially expensive designs such as slab track but which 27 
have lower life cycle drainage failure associated maintenance cost risks (56).  28 
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